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REPLY ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
The District Court Erred By Reversing Its Finding That Carmouche Is A 
Persistent Violator 
A Introduction 
On appeal the state contends that the district court erred by reversing its 
finding that Carmouche is subject to the persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement. (Appellant's brief.) Specifically, because hearsay evidence 
admitted without objection is competent evidence, the district court erred by 
reconsidering and reversing its finding that Carmouche is a persistent violator on 
the basis that unobjected-to hearsay was admitted at the trial of that 
enhancement. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-7.) Alternatively, the state contends that 
the proper remedy for any conclusion that evidence has been erroneously 
admitted at a trial would have been to grant a new trial on the enhancement 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8) and that the district court erred in finding the evidence 
submitted inadequate even without the hearsay (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10). 
In response Carmouche claims three bars apply to prevent review of the 
state's issue: double jeopardy (Respondent's brief, pp. 18-27), inadequate record 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 28-29), and invited error (Respondent's brief, pp. 29-
30). On the merits of the state's issue he claims that a district court may make 
post-trial evidentiary rulings sua sponte and without notice to the parties when it 
is the trier of fact, and therefore the district court properly excluded the 
1 
unobjected-to hearsay after trial and without notice to the parties. 1 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 30-32.) Finally, Carmouche asserts any error was 
harmless. (Respondent's brief, pp. 32-33.) Carmouche's arguments fail. On the 
merits of the claim, Carmouche advocates for a legal standard that does not 
exist. His procedural bars fail because Carmouche is not at risk of being 
subjected to jeopardy again; the record of the district court's error is plain; and 
Carmouche's claim of invited error, made in reliance on statements the district 
court made after its ruling, is facially without merit. 
B. Carmouche's Invocation Of A Harmless Error Standard Does Not Indicate 
That A Trial Court May Make Post-Trial, Post-Conviction Evidentiary 
Rulings 
Carmouche argues that the rule that hearsay admitted without objection is 
competent evidence, cited by the state (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7), applies only to 
jury trials, and that the presumption that a trial court did not consider 
incompetent evidence allows, or even requires, a trial court to effectively make 
post-hearing evidentiary rulings. (Respondent's brief, pp. 30-32.) Review of the 
authority cited, however, shows that the presumption relied upon by Carmouche 
is merely an incarnation of the harmless error rule. It in no way supports 
Carmouche's argument or the trial court's actions. 
1 Carmouche does not challenge the state's argument that the evidence was 
adequate to support a finding that Carmouche was a persistent violator even 
disregarding the evidence of his social security number. (See Respondent's 
brief.) Such omission is in lieu of concession in light of recent Idaho Supreme 
Court authority holding that name and birth date can be sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that a defendant is a persistent violator. State v. Parton, _ 
Idaho_,_ P.3d _, 2013 WL 427438 (2013). 
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The case Carmouche primarily relies upon is State v. Powell, 120 Idaho 
707, 819 P.2d 561 (1991). (Respondent's brief, p. 31.) In that case Powell 
objected to the admission into his court trial of testimony from two witnesses and 
of notes taken by a third witness. Powell, 120 Idaho at 709-10, 819 P .2d at 563-
64. The district court overruled the objections, allowing the witnesses to testify 
(without limit) and admitting the notes (with the caveat that the court "would only 
take into account what was legally admissible") . .!st at 710, 819 P.2d at 564. In 
addressing Powell's appellate challenge to these evidentiary rulings, the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated that although admission of evidence in a court trial is 
more "liberal" than in a jury trial, "this difference should not result in an 
evidentiary free-for-all." .!st (internal quotations omitted). The Idaho Supreme 
Court noted the presumption, applied in civil cases, "that the trial court did not 
consider incompetent or inadmissible evidence in making its findings," such that 
"this Court will not reverse a trial court in a non-jury case on the basis of an 
erroneous admission of evidence unless it appears that the opposing party was 
misled or surprised in a substantial part of its case, or that the trial court 
materially relied on the erroneously admitted evidence." .!st (internal quotations 
omitted, emphasis added). The Court extended this rule to criminal cases, such 
that "in non-jury proceedings a new trial ordinarily will not be granted for error in 
the admission of evidence, if there remains substantial admissible evidence to 
otherwise support the trial court's findings." .!st (internal quotations omitted, 
emphasis added). 
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As with Powell, review of the other cases relied on by Carmouche show 
that the legal standard he advocates applies at the appellate level where a 
district court has overruled an objection and admitted evidence, such that a new 
trial is not granted unless the record shows that the trial court actually relied on 
the inadmissible evidence. Shrum v. Wakimoto, 70 Idaho 252, 215 P.2d 991 
(1950) (presumption that evidence was considered in making a decision does 
not apply in court trials, but rather there is presumption that court ignored 
"incompetent testimony"); Goody v. Maryland Casualty Co., 53 Idaho 523, 25 
P.2d 1045, 1047 (1933) (error in admitting evidence is "not ground for reversal" 
in face of presumption that judge disregarded improperly admitted evidence); 
Brinton v. Johnson, 41 Idaho 583, 240 P. 859, 862 (1925) (if "incompetent 
evidence was conditionally received" by the trial court, the appellate court 
presumes the evidence was not considered "unless the contrary is made to 
appear"). (Appellant's brief, p. 31.) This Court applied the same presumption in 
Stephens v. City of Notus, 101Idaho101, 103-04, 609 P.2d 168, 170-71 (1980), 
where it found appellate claims of "several erroneous rulings in the admission of 
evidence " did not "merit discussion" because "any error was harmless" based on 
the presumption that "the trial court sitting without a jury . . . did not consider 
[incompetent evidence] in reaching its findings unless the contrary is shown." 
Review of the cases shows that the presumption that a trial court did not 
consider incompetent or erroneously admitted evidence is a harmless error test 
applicable on appeal where the objection was preserved. It is not a rule that trial 
courts may accept evidence without objection at trial and then, without notice to 
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the parties, exclude the previously admitted evidence. In none of the cases cited 
by Carmouche is that what happened. A rule allowing a district court to review 
admissibility of admitted evidence post-trial and without notice, and then exclude 
the evidence without giving the party presenting the evidence the opportunity to 
present admissible evidence on that issue, would have pernicious results. For 
example, if the evidence excluded post-trial in this case had been evidence of 
Carmouche's alibi, rather than being evidence of Carmouche's social security 
number, this Court would not pause in reversing the district court. Carmouche's 
argument, that the harmless error presumption that a trial court did not consider 
incompetent evidence allows a trial court to make post-trial evidentiary rulings 
without notice to the parties or the chance to present admissible evidence, is 
without legal merit. 
Finally, even if the presumption that the district court did not rely on 
incompetent evidence applied in this case, the law is that hearsay admitted 
without objection is competent evidence. Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100, 105, 
254 P.3d 1, 6 (2011) ("hearsay evidence admitted without objection is as strong 
as any other legally competent evidence" (internal quotes omitted)). Carmouche 
has cited to no relevant law indicating that the district court did not err when it-
post-trial, post-ruling, and without notice to the parties-excluded hearsay 
evidence admitted at the trial without objection and reversed its prior finding that 
Carmouche is a persistent violator. 
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C. The State's Appeal Is Not Barred By The Prohibition Against Double 
Jeopardy 
Carmouche asserts the state may not proceed on appeal because double 
jeopardy would bar any relief. (Respondent's brief, pp. 18-27.) This argument 
fails because no further fact finding is necessary in this case should the state 
prevail, and therefore there is no need to retry Carmouche and no second 
jeopardy will occur. 
It is undisputed that protections against double jeopardy prevent the state 
from retrying a defendant after an acquittal, regardless of any error that might 
underlie such acquittal. Evans v. Michigan, _U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 1075-
76 (2013) ("an acquittal due to insufficient evidence precludes retrial, whether the 
court's evaluation of the evidence was correct or not, and regardless of whether 
the court's decision flowed from an incorrect antecedent ruling of law"); Sanabria 
v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 (1978) ("when a defendant has been acquitted 
at trial he may not be retried on the same offense, even if the legal rulings 
underlying the acquittal were erroneous"). Retrial, for purposes of double 
jeopardy, means '"postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or 
innocence."' Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005) (quoting Smalis 
v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986)). 
The state is not seeking postacquittal factfinding going to guilt or 
innocence. (Appellant's brief, p. 10 (requesting Court to "reverse the district 
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court's judgment of acquittal, reinstate the verdictr21 finding Carmouche is a 
persistent violator, and remand for a new sentencing").) Because the state is not 
requesting that Carmouche again be placed in jeopardy, there is no double 
jeopardy bar in this case. 
D. The Record On Appeal Is Adequate 
The appellant has the burden of providing an adequate record to 
substantiate his or her claims of error before the appellate court. State v. 
Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991). "In the 
absence of an adequate record on appeal, we will not presume error." State v. 
Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 823, 992 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Ct. App. 1999). "Missing 
portions of the record must be presumed to support the action of the trial court." 
kl at 823, 992 P.2d at 1223. 
Carmouche argues that a transcript of a hearing on a motion to reconsider 
the order the state challenges on appeal is necessary for an adequate appellate 
record. (Respondent's brief, pp. 28-29.) Because nothing occurring at the 
2 Carmouche argues that the district court's oral findings were not a "verdict." 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 23-24.) This argument is only relevant to the state's 
alternative argument that the district court erred when it concluded the admission 
of hearsay evidence was not merely trial error meriting a new trial. Regardless of 
whether the district court's factual findings are characterized as a "verdict" or not, 
they are a finding that the state met its burden of proof. (11/12/10 Tr., p. 58, L. 
12 - p. 60, L. 19.) The court's oral determination of guilt at the trial, at a 
minimum, supports a verdict, so no further factfinding is required. Therefore 
Carmouche will not, by definition, be placed in jeopardy a second time by entry 
of an order (a "verdict") based on the trial court's original, nonerroneous, oral 
determination that the state had proved Carmouches' guilt. 
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subsequent hearing could have played any role in the issuance of the prior, 
challenged order, this argument is frivolous. 
E. The District Court's Error Was Not Invited 
The doctrine of invited error estops a party from complaining that a ruling 
of the trial court that the party invited, consented to, or acquiesced in was error. 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). The invited 
error doctrine prevents a party who "caused or played an important role in 
prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later challenging that 
decision on appeal." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 
(1999). Carmouche argues that statements in the minutes of the hearing on the 
state's motion for reconsideration estop the state, under the doctrine of invited 
error, from claiming error in the very order it was challenging on reconsideration. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 29-30.) Because comments made subsequent to entry 
of the order cannot have "caused or played an important role in prompting [the] 
trial court" to enter the order, this argument is also frivolous. 3 
3 Carmouche's argument is also a gross misrepresentation of the record. The 
portion of the minutes Carmouche cites in support of his claim the prosecutor 
conceded issues makes it clear it was the district court that was speaking, not 
the prosecutor, but such language was omitted by Carmouche with an ellipse. 
(Compare R., pp. 177-78 (paragraph starts, "The Court addressed the parties ... " 
(emphasis added)) with Respondent's brief, p. 29 (paragraph quoted starts 
" ... ").) In context it is clear the district court was merely reciting the issues raised 
and not raised in the Motion to Reconsider. (R., pp. 177-78.) The Motion to 
Reconsider states, "The state will not argue at this time whether or not the Court 
should have reversed itself. The state does not waive its right to contest that 
ruling at some later date." (R., p. 170.) This caveat on the state's limitation of 
issues on reconsideration is not mentioned in Carmouche's brief. (See 
Respondent's brief.) 
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F. The Error Was Not Harmless 
An error of the sort committed by the district court in this case may be 
found harmless. State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 990 P.2d 144 (1999) (error 
in effectively dismissing persistent violator charge harmless). Error will be 
deemed harmless only if "the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the same result would have been reached, regardless of the error." 
~at 566, 990 P.2d at 147. 
Carmouche argues "the record in this case fails to disclose any reason to 
believe that his sentences would be different in any respect had he been 
convicted of the persistent violator sentencing enhancements " 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 32-33.) Carmouches' review of the record has 
apparently been less than thorough. The record reveals that the district court 
initially pronounced a sentence of 15 years with four years determinate on Count 
IV, domestic battery, but then reduced the sentence to ten years with four fixed 
when Carmouches' trial counsel pointed out that the maximum sentence was ten 
years. (R., pp. 272-73; 06/20/11 Tr., p. 55, Ls. 3-6; p.57, Ls. 11-15.) The fact 
the district court imposed a sentence on one of the counts that would have been 
legal with the enhancement but had to be reduced without the enhancement 
because it exceeded the maximum affirmatively disproves Carmouche's claim of 
harmless error. 
In Harrington the Idaho Court of Appeals held the error related to the 
enhancement was harmless because the district court effectively said that the 
enhancement would not have changed the length of the sentence. Harrington, 
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133 Idaho at 567, 990 P.2d at 148. No such statement appears in our record. 
To the contrary, the record establishes that at least one of the sentences was in 
fact reduced because of the lack of the enhancement. The record does not 
affirmatively establish that the sentences on the other three counts would have 
been identical had the enhancement applied. Carmouche has failed to show, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the same sentences would have been imposed 
but for the district court's error in reversing its finding of guilt on the persistent 
violator enhancement. 
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ISSUE ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Carmouche states the issue on cross-appeal as: 
3. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of 
a fundamental error, when the prosecutor argued evidence 
of Mr. Carmouche's refusal to permit police to enter his 
home as supporting an inference of guilt of the charged 
offenses? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 17.) 
The state rephrases the issue on cross-appeal as: 
Has Carmouche failed to show prosecutorial misconduct, much less 
fundamental error, in the prosecutor's argument that evidence, admitted at trial, 
of Carmouche's efforts to prevent the police from conducting a welfare check on 
his injured victim showed his version of events was unbelievable? 
11 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Carmouche Has Failed To Show That The Prosecution's Reference In Closing 
Argument To Evidence Admitted At Trial Without Objection Constituted 
Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
At trial the state presented, without objection, evidence that police 
responded to Number 9, North Sugar, Apartment 102, to make a "welfare check" 
in response to a call to a suicide hotline made by "Darren." (Trial Tr., p. 31, L. 21 
- p. 34, L. 15; p. 134, L. 10 - p. 135, L. 9; p. 178, Ls. 5-25.) There officers made 
contact with Carmouche, who told them that everything was fine and that they 
should leave. (Trial Tr., p. 34, L. 16 - p. 35, L. 25; p. 179. Ls. 1-9.) Officers 
insisted that Carmouche exit the apartment so they could check his welfare. 
(Trial Tr., p. 35, L. 25 - p. 36, L. 2.) When Carmouche refused to come out 
officers threatened to break the door to enter and assure everyone's safety. 
(Trial Tr., p. 36, Ls. 3-13; p. 135, L. 10 - p. 136, L. 3.) 
Carmouche then exited and talked with officers. (Trial Tr., p. 36, L. 14 -
p. 37, L. 24.) When he exited Carmouche immediately closed the door behind 
him. (Trial Tr., p. 37, L. 25 - p. 38, L. 3.) Carmouche stated his girlfriend, 
Kirsteen, was in the apartment, but when officers asked to enter to check on her 
welfare Carmouche stated he "knew his rights" and police "could not enter the 
residence." (Trial Tr., p. 38, Ls. 4-19.) Carmouche gave officers permission to 
yell through the closed door for Kirsteen to come out, but officers got no 
response to the yelling. (Trial Tr., p. 38, L. 20 - p. 39, L. 8.) 
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Officers continued to express a desire to check on Kirsteen's welfare, and 
Carmouche relented to an officer opening the door, sticking his head in the 
apartment, and yelling for Kirsteen. (Trial Tr., p. 39, Ls. 9-18.) The officer did 
so, but again got no response. (Trial Tr., p. 39, L. 19 - p. 40, L. 3.) The officer 
leaned further in, and saw what appeared to be a woman laying on the couch. 
(Trial Tr., p. 40, Ls. 4-21.) He also saw a broken vase, clothing thrown 
throughout the living room and other items scattered about. (Trial Tr., p. 41, Ls. 
19-24.) He continued yelling for Kirsteen to come out but got no response. 
(Trial Tr., p. 40, L. 22 - p. 41, L. 2.) 
Eventually Kirsteen responded and came to the door. (Trial Tr., p. 41, Ls. 
9-12.) She had obvious injuries.4 (Trial Tr., p. 41, Ls. 13-18; p. 137, L. 9 - p. 
139, L. 23.) Officers interviewed Kirsteen, after which she was taken to the 
hospital. (Trial Tr., p. 42, L. 16 - p. 43, L. 5.) 
Carmouche testified he got home and found that Kirsteen had been 
beaten up. (Trial Tr., p. 327, Ls. 8-20; p. 329, L. 5 - p. 330, L. 24.) He offered to 
take her to the hospital, but she declined, and he wanted to call the police, but 
"we were all high." (Trial Tr., p. 330, L. 25 - p. 331, L. 7.) She then started 
arguing with him because he had "taken the drugs," and the argument escalated, 
but he did nothing more physical than push her to the ground. (Trial Tr., p. 331, 
Ls. 8-20.) Carmouche "really needed somebody to talk to" and called the suicide 
4 Those injuries included bruising on the head and ears, a partially fractured 
tooth, abrasions to the neck, bruising on the back, bruising on the left thigh, 
bruising on the lower extremities, and a fractured rib. (Trial Tr., p. 168, L. 6 - p. 
170, L. 3; State's Exhibits 13, 15-18, 20, 29, 30-35.) 
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hotline number. (Trial Tr., p. 332, L. 2 - p. 333, L. 7.) Kirsteen responded to his 
call by trying to cut her wrists with a kitchen knife so she could die with him. 
(Trial Tr., p. 333, Ls. 8-25.) Carmouche then tried to convince Kirsteen to go to 
the hospital until the police arrived. (Trial Tr., p. 334, L. 3 - p. 335, L. 8.) 
In closing arguments the prosecutor pointed out, without objection, that 
Carmouche's actions in taking steps to prevent the police from learning about 
Kirsteen's injuries were at odds with his testimony that he simply found her badly 
beaten that morning and wanted her to get help. (Trial Tr., p. 378, Ls. 2-12.) 
Carmouche claims, for the first time on appeal, that such argument was 
fundamental error. He has failed to show error, much less fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial." State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). In the absence of an 
objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is strictly 
circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being deprived of 
his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair 
tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Review 
without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that "one or 
more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) the 
constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any 
additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to object 
was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the error 
14 
affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable 
probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings." kl 
at 225, 245 P.3d at 977. 
C. Carmouche Has Failed To Establish Error, Much Less Fundamental Error 
1. Carmouche Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor Commented 
On Any Valid Invocation Of Rights 
"[l]t is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even 
universally condemned. The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' 
comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction 
a denial of due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 
209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor."); State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 1008 (Ct. 
App; 1991) (the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor 
for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the 
defendant's right to a fair trial"). It is prosecutorial misconduct, and even 
potentially fundamental error, to argue that the invocation of Fourth Amendment 
rights is evidence of guilt. State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 262 P.3d 278 
(2011). This did not happen in this case for two reasons. First, Carmouche has 
failed to establish he had a Fourth Amendment right to invoke under the 
circumstances. The officer testified that there was an exigency that required him 
to check the welfare of those in the apartment, to the point he was willing to 
15 
"break the door down" to conduct that welfare check. (Trial Tr., p. 34, L. 16 - p. 
40, L. 18.) Carmouche has failed to establish that he had a right to prevent 
officers from conducting the welfare check by denying permission to enter. See 
State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 141 P.3d 1166 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Among the core 
community caretaking activities are the responsibilities of police to search for 
missing persons, mediate disputes, aid the ill or injured, and provide emergency 
services."). Because Carmouche was not invoking an existing Fourth 
Amendment right, it was not misconduct to mention evidence of Carmouche's 
attempt to prevent officers from discovering Kirsteen's injuries. 
Second, although invocation of rights cannot be used for the purpose of 
showing guilt, it is proper to use such evidence to rebut or impeach a defendant's 
claimed version of events. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 n.11 (1976); 
State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 960, 231 P.3d 1047, 1057 (Ct. App. 2010). The 
argument by the prosecutor was that Carmouche's efforts to prevent police from 
contacting Kirsteen were inconsistent with his claims that he in fact wanted the 
police involved after she had been beaten by someone else. (Trial Tr., p. 378, 
Ls. 2-12; seep. 327, Ls. 8-20; p. 330, Ls. 7-18; p. 331, Ls. 2-4, 23-25; p. 333, 
Ls. 14-19; p. 334, L. 17 - p. 335, L. 5; p. 335, Ls. 9-13.) 
2. The Claimed Error Is Not Clear On The Record 
Carmouche made no motion to suppress evidence based on any claim 
that he validly invoked his Fourth Amendment rights. (See generally R.) 
Whether officers were properly acting under a Fourth Amendment exception 
when they ordered Carmouche from his apartment and partially entered the 
16 
apartment to conduct a welfare check without his consent was therefore not 
litigated. In addition, it appears the police had evidence suggesting the need to 
enter the apartment under exigent circumstances or for community caretaking 
that was not presented at the trial. (£&.Trial Tr., p. 334, Ls. 3-10 (Carmouche 
testified that he accidentally left the phone connected to the suicide hotline so 
those at the other end heard some of the events in the apartment).) Having 
apparently declined to bring a motion to suppress, which indicates that defense 
counsel elected to make no objection claiming a violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights because he knew that such a motion was fruitless or would have 
potentially put additional matters before the court or jury, Carmouche cannot 
show on appeal that the record is adequate to demonstrate he validly invoked a 
Fourth Amendment right. 
3. Carmouche Has Shown No Prejudice 
Finally, because the prosecutor's argument can be construed as a proper 
rebuttal to Carmouche's claim he wished Kirsteen to get medical help and 
wanted police involvement, Carmouche has failed to show that the jury would 
necessarily have considered this argument as inviting an improper inference of 
guilt. Even if such an interpretation were reasonable, the evidence of 
Carmouche's guilt is so overwhelming that the jury would not have reached a 
different result anyway. 
For these reasons, Carmouche has failed to show any element of his 
claim of fundamental error. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state requests this court to reject the claim raised on cross-appeal 
and affirm the jury's verdict, but remand for a new sentencing based on the error 
asserted on appeal. 
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